Measuring Trust by Glaeser, Edward Ludwig et al.
 
Measuring Trust
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Glaeser, Edward, David Laibson, Jose Scheinkman, and Christine
Soutter. 2000. Measuring trust. Quarterly Journal of Economics
115(3): 811-846.
Published Version doi:10.1162/003355300554926
Accessed February 18, 2015 2:28:25 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4481497
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAMEASURING TRUST*
EDWARD L. GLAESER
DAVID I. LAIBSON
JOSE ￿ A. SCHEINKMAN
CHRISTINE L. SOUTTER
We combine two experiments and a survey to measure trust and trustworthi-
ness—two key components of social capital. Standard attitudinal survey questions
about trust predict trustworthy behavior in our experiments much better than they
predict trusting behavior. Trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by
past trusting behavior outside of the experiments. When individuals are closer
socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise. Trustworthiness declines when
partners are of different races or nationalities. High status individuals are able to
elicit more trustworthiness in others.
I. INTRODUCTION
A growing body of research suggests that ‘‘social capital’’
inﬂuences a wide range of signiﬁcant economic and political
phenomena. For example, Arrow [1972] and Fukuyama [1995]
believe that the level of trust in a society strongly predicts its
economic success. Putnam [1993] uses Italian cross-regional data
to show that local governments are more efficient where there is
greater civic engagement. In recent years, economists have tried
to identify the impact of social capital by using attitudinal
measures of trust from survey questionnaires. Knack and Keefer
[1997], for example, show that an increase of one standard
deviation in country-level trust predicts an increase in economic
growth of more than one-half of a standard deviation. La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [1997] ﬁnd that a standard
deviation increase in trust increases judicial efficiency by 0.7 of a
standard deviation and reduces government corruption by 0.3 of a
standard deviation.1
The great lacuna in this research agenda is the measurement
of trust. Much of the social capital research relies upon attitudinal
survey questions from the General Social Survey (GSS) such as
* The MacArthur Foundation has generously funded this research which is
part of the MacArthur Foundation Network on Norms and Preferences. Glaeser
and Laibson also thank the National Science Foundation, the Sloan Foundation,
and the Olin Foundation. David Cutler, Lawrence Katz, George Loewenstein,
Andrei Shleifer, and Steven Tadelis provided helpful comments. Beth Bellman,
Meghana Bhatt, Elizabeth Dunn, Elizabeth Kelsinger, Lars Nesheim, Joseph
Robbins, and Stephen Weinberg provided excellent research assistance.
1. See also Jacobs [1961], Loury [1977], and Coleman [1990] for additional
claims about the importance of social capital.
r 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2000
811
Page811
@xyserv1/disk4/CLS_jrnlkz/GRP_qjec/JOB_qjec115-3/DIV_107a01 dawn‘‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’’
While these survey questions are interesting, they are also vague,
abstract, and hard to interpret. Putnam [1995], for example,
laments this problem: ‘‘since trust is so central to the theory of
social capital, it would be desirable to have strong behavioral
indicators of trends in social trust or misanthropy. I have discov-
ered no such behavioral measures.’’
In this paper we measure trust and trustworthiness by
conducting experiments with monetary rewards. Because we
measure subjects’ attitudes, background characteristics, and so-
cial connectedness, we can identify individual and situational
correlates of trust. For example, we test whether the standard
attitudinal trust questions predict actual trusting behavior with
real money. The primary methodological point of this paper is that
experimentscanbeintegratedwithsurveystomeasureindividual-
level variation in traditionally hard-to-measure characteristics
such as trust and trustworthiness.
We ﬁrst ask survey questions of a sample of 258 Harvard
undergraduates. Three to four weeks later, a subgroup of 196
undergraduates plays two experimental trust games. In the ﬁrst
game, subjects are paired and meet their partner. They are then
separated, and one member of the pair (the sender) has the
opportunity to send between 0 and 15 dollars to his or her partner
(the recipient).2 The experimenter doubles each dollar that is sent.
After the second player receives the transfer (i.e., twice the
amount sent), he or she may return money back to the ﬁrst
player.3 This game (based on Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe [1995])
is similar to many economically relevant settings such as invest-
ment with imperfect contracts or production of a public good. We
think of the amount sent by the ‘‘sender’’ as a natural measure of
trust. The sender trusts the ‘‘recipient’’to return a fair share of the
amount the recipient receives. Similarly, controlling for the
amount sent, the amount returned is a measure of trustworthiness.
In our second game, subjects report valuations for a series of
‘‘envelope drops.’’Subjects are told that an envelope, addressed to
the subject and containing 10 dollars, will be intentionally
dropped by an experimenter. If a subject typically places a high
2. One-half of the sample of trustees (chosen randomly) were given the
opportunity to promise beforehand to return at least as much money as they were
sent by the trustor.
3. All of the rules of the game are common knowledge.
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more likely to trust the anonymous strangers who will ﬁnd the
apparently lost envelope.
Previous research has explored both types of experiments
that we study. The primary difference between our work and most
previous work is that we ask whether subject characteristics
predict the choices that subjects make in these experiments.
We ﬁrst examine the predictive power of two types of survey
questions: questions about trusting attitudes and questions about
past trusting behavior. In both of our games, the standard
attitudinal questions generally do not predict subject choices in
our experiments.4 Of ten different variants of broad attitudinal
questions, none has a signiﬁcant correlation with trusting choices
in either experiment that we conducted.5 However, we identify
two relatively precise attitudinal questions about trusting strang-
ers that did predict trust in both games.
Measures of past trusting behavior are better than the
abstract attitudinal questions in predicting subjects’ experimen-
tal choices. An index of past trusting behavior—based on speciﬁc
behavioral questions that we developed—has a 22.4 percent
correlation with the amount sent in the trust game, and a 14.6
percent correlation with the average valuation in the envelope
drop. These positive correlations suggest that a component of
trusting behavior may be stable across time and choice domains.
We also ﬁnd a 15.8 percent correlation (marginally signiﬁcant)
between trust in the envelope drop experiment and trust in the
two-person trust game.
Although questions about trusting attitudes do not predict
trustingbehavior,suchquestionsdoappeartopredicttrustworthi-
ness.An index of an individual’s response to GSS attitudinal trust
questions has a 34 percent correlation with the amount of money
that the individual himself gives back. While attitudinal trust
surveys at best weakly predict any individual’s level of trust, they may
be good at predicting the overall level of trustworthiness in society.
While our primary purpose is methodological, the experi-
4. This ﬁnding is consistent with numerous studies that report a lack of
correlation between attitudes and behavior (e.g., review by Ajzen and Fishbein
[1977], although see Kraus [1995] for a different perspective). The classic example
is LaPiere’s [1934] ﬁnding that self-reported unwillingness to serve racial minori-
ties was inconsistent with restaurant or motel owners’ actual behavior toward
minorities.
5. Because of our small sample size we cannot rule out a small positive
relationship between the trust survey questions and trust in the experiments.
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results. First, as theory predicts, the degree of social connection
between the sender and recipient—the number of friends they
have in common and the duration of their acquaintanceship—
generally predicts the levels of trust and trustworthiness in the
two-person trust game. These results support the idea that
repeated play in dense social networks facilitates trust (as in
Abreu [1988] and Greif [1993]).6 This result is not surprising, and
we consider it to be less important as validation for the theory
than as validation for the experiments.
Second, we ﬁnd that subjects who are paired with a partner of
a different race or nationality send back less money to their
partner.7 Eleven out of the twelve times in which the recipient
sent back nothing, the sender and the recipient were of different
races. These effects are stronger than the social network effects
and survive controls for the social connection of the sender and
recipient. This ﬁnding is also unsurprising, but serves as a
reminder of the continuing barriers that racial and national
differences may create.
Third, we ﬁnd that background characteristics capturing the
level of status and organization membership—variables meant to
serve as proxies for an individual’s own social capital—strongly
predict the amount of money that senders receive back from
recipients, and strongly predict the ﬁnancial returns for senders.
People with better educated parents, students who work fewer
hours for pay, individuals with more friends, and members of
volunteer organizations all earn more money in the experiment.
These results imply that in at least one stylized setting, noncognitive
social skills may be important determinants of economic returns.
II. EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT OF TRUST—THE CURRENT APPROACH
The empirical literature on trust has focused on responses to
the question: ‘‘Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing
with people?’’ This question is taken from the National Opinion
6. Fershtman and Gneezy [1998] also use a variant of this game to examine
trust in Israel and ﬁnd a similar result. They document the importance of group
membership by showing that males (not females) are less trusting of Sephardic
males. In their version of the game, players do not meet one another, and they are
left to deduce ethnic background from their opponents’last name.
7. We use country of residence at age sixteen as a proxy for nationality.
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primary source for U. S. evidence on trust and social capital. Since
its inception in 1972 the survey has been administered twenty
times to a sample of between one and two thousand respondents.
The set of questions on the GSS changes from survey to survey,
but the GSS trust question has been asked almost continuously.
Subject responses to the GSS trust question are difficult to
interpret.8 Variation in responses might arise for numerous
reasons: e.g., differences in beliefs about the trustworthiness of a
common set of people; differences in interpretation of who com-
prises ‘‘most people;’’ differences in interpretation of what it
means to be able to trust someone; or differences in the ability to
elicit trustworthy behavior from other people.9 Variation may also
arise because some respondents are not willing to answer truth-
fully when asked such a question on a survey. Our experiments
suggest a new framework for interpretation of the GSS trust
question.
Before turning to our experimental analysis, we ﬁrst discuss
the standard empirical analysis of the GSS trust question.
Putnam [1995] and others have analyzed the GSS data and drawn
two important conclusions. First, younger cohorts are dramati-
cally less likely to report that ‘‘most people can be trusted.’’
Second, organization membership, an important measure of social
capital, exhibits a similar downward trend. These stylized facts
have generated a substantial debate about declining social capital
in the United States. Using a multiple regression framework, we
replicate these earlier ﬁndings.
Table I gives mean answers to the trust question for both the
entire sample of GSS respondents and for different subpopula-
tions. This crude evidence suggests substantial variation in
responses by cohort, education, and race: e.g., 42.3 percent of the
cohort with birth years between 1911 and 1915 report that ‘‘most
people can be trusted,’’ compared with 30.1 percent of the cohort
born between 1961 and 1965. Table I also compares GSS data with
the responses of Harvard undergraduates who participated in our
trust experiment: 42.6 percent of young and college-educated GSS
8. Schwarz [1999] notes that all self-reported instruments are subject to
distortion, with various features of the questions such as ambiguity and format
readily producing unintended effects on subjects’responses.
9. It seems unlikely that differences in altruism drive answers to this
question (although certainly altruistic attitudes might correlate with the answers
to this question).
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rate of 44.4 percent in our Harvard sample.
Mean response rates by demographic group confound many
different effects in the GSS data. Table II identiﬁes these separate
effects with probit regressions that estimate how different charac-
teristics explain trust.10 The ﬁrst regression of Table II presents
our benchmark results. Trust is much lower for later cohorts. The
gap in the level of trust between individuals who were born before
1915 and those who are born after 1959 is 21.4 percent.11 Trust is
much higher among richer and well-educated individuals. College
graduates are more than 30 percent more likely to answer yes to
the trust question than high school dropouts. Blacks are 21
percent less likely to say that they are trusting than whites.12 Men
are slightly more trusting. Married persons are also more trust-
ing. City size has a slightly negative effect on the amount of trust.
Members of more educated (or wealthier) religious denominations
10. Table II reports the marginal effects of the variables.
11. We cannot separately identify age, cohort, and time effects, due to
multicollinearity.Weidentifyageandcohorteffectsbyassumingawaytimeeffects.
12. The gap between the races diminishes in states where blacks are less of a
minority.
TABLE I
AVERAGE LEVELS OF TRUST
Q. ‘‘Generally Speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’’
Percent responding that. . .
‘ ‘ ...m o s tp e o p l ec a nb et r u sted’’
US (1972–1996): 39.9%
US (White): 44.2%
US (Black): 16.1%
US (other races): 26.6%
US (1911–1915 birthyear): 42.3%
US (1961–1965 birthyear): 30.1%
US (no high school diploma): 26.3%
US (high school diploma): 45.0%
US (college diploma): 58.5%
US (college diploma, 1996): 49.7%
US (college diploma and birthyear after 1965): 42.6%
Harvard Undergraduates (1997) 44.4%
Harvard data are from the authors’survey.
Source: The National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey, 1972–1994.
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GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY RESULTS
Dependent variable:
GSS trust
(1)
Organization membership
(# of types of organizations)
(2)
Born before 1915 0.2142 0.4929
(0.0216) (0.0837)
Born between 1915 and 1929 0.1538 0.5689
(0.0176) (0.0690)
Born between 1930 and 1944 0.1331 0.3712
(0.0141) (0.0571)
Born between 1945 and 1959 0.0782 20.0088
(0.0107) (0.0443)
Age between 25 and 34 20.0238 20.0686
(0.0124) (0.0470)
Age between 35 and 44 0.0229 0.0940
(0.0141) (0.0547)
Age between 45 and 54 0.0417 20.1250
(0.0164) (0.0662)
Age between 55 and 64 0.0219 20.2087
(0.0185) (0.0732)
Age between 65 and 99 20.0175 20.3004
(0.0198) (0.0800)
College education 0.1720 1.1743
(0.0088) (0.0344)
Dropout 20.1638 20.6922
(0.0077) (0.0308)
Log (real income) 0.0154 0.0715
(0.0051) (0.0182)
Black 20.2091 0.0941
(0.0093) (0.0411)
Male 0.0343 0.2562
(0.0066) (0.0249)
Married 0.0338 0.0802
(0.0761) (0.0294)
Town 20.0227 20.0734
(0.0117) (0.0455)
Small city 20.0200 20.1174
(0.0138) (0.0542)
Big city 20.0505 20.2208
(0.0145) (0.0575)
Catholic 0.0120 20.0194
(0.0098) (0.0372)
Jew 20.0216 0.1356
(0.0234) (0.0915)
No religion 20.0041 20.5868
(0.0134) (0.0533)
Baptist 20.0582 20.1116
(0.0103) (0.0532)
Methodist 0.0363 0.1397
(0.0126) (0.0465)
Lutheran 0.0749 0.1821
(0.0144) (0.0532)
Presbyterian 0.0842 0.3122
(0.0177) (0.0638)
Episcopalian 0.0758 0.2260
(0.0224) (0.0840)
Constant 0.3828 1.3282
(0.0762)
R2 0.0855 0.1431
Observations 23867 19133
Data are from the General Social Survey, 1972–1994. Standard errors are in parentheses. Regression (1)
is a probit. We report derivatives at sample means. Regression (2) is OLS. In regression (1) the constant is the
mean probability at mean values of the explanatory variables. R2 is pseudo R2 for regression (1) and adjusted
R2 for regression (2). Town population is between 2000 and 100,000. Small City population is between 100,000
and 500,000. Big City population is above 500,000. The omitted category for religion is Protestant, no
denomination.
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educated religious group, report that they are less trusting.13
Goldin and Katz [1999] ﬁnd that the proportion of residents
in an area who were Lutheran in the early part of this century
strongly predicts current measures of social capital. We ﬁnd that
the proportion of Lutherans in a state is a strong predictor of
state-level trust,14 but that state effects can only explain a small
amount of individual variation in trust.15
Most of these results have multiple interpretations. For
example, the positive effect of education on trust might occur
because more educated people associate with other more educated
people who are, for some reason, more trustworthy.16 Alterna-
tively, education might create individual social capital by raising
social skills or because high status increases the ability to reward
and punish others.
The second regression of Table II repeats this analysis using
membershipinnonprofessionalorganizations—anobservablemea-
sure of social behavior—as the dependent variable. Speciﬁcally,
this variable represents the number of different types of organiza-
tions in which the individual is a member. The correlation of this
variable with the GSS trust measure is high, and many of the
same patterns continue to hold. For example, the basic cohort,
education, and income effects remain. There are only two real
differences. Age effects peak between 35 and 44, and the race
dummy (Blacks 5 1) now takes a positive coefficient.17 This racial
effect on organization membership follows from the high rate of
religious affiliation ofAfrican-Americans.
We have run similar regressions outside the United States.
Thepositiveeffectofeducationontrustandorganizationmember-
ship is close to ubiquitous. Measured trust does not, however,
generally decline for younger cohorts outside of the United States.
We now proceed to our experiments. Putnam and others have
13. La Porta et al. [1997] argue that hierarchical religions reduce social
capital at the country level because the operation of these religions entails less
cooperative interaction between lay people. We see no evidence for this in the
United States. Iannaccone [1991] argues that religion serves a large social
purpose, and we might expect to ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more trust among members of
particular religious groups (see also Glaeser and Glendon [1998]).
14. This analysis is available from the authors upon request.
15. Percent Lutheran explains 30 percent of the variation in the mean level of
trust across states.
16. For example, generally acting in a trustworthy manner may be a luxury
good, which is consumed disproportionately by people with high incomes.
17. This ﬁnding does not change when we control for the number of children
in the household.
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question, and we have conﬁrmed the existence of these trends.
However, it remains unclear whether these trends in survey
responses accurately reﬂect trends in social capital. Our primary
goal is to understand what the survey question about trust
actually measures.
III. SURVEY AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Subjects were recruited from Harvard’s introductory econom-
ics course (Social Analysis 10, or ‘‘Ec10’’) during the ﬁrst week of
class.18 Out of approximately 1000 Ec10 students, 274 agreed to
participate, of whom 189 completed all parts of the study.19
Our experimental procedure has three components. First,
subjects are asked to ﬁll out a survey. Three to four weeks later,
subjects participate in two experiments, the ‘‘Trust Game’’and the
‘‘Envelope Drop.’’
Part 1, Survey. Subjects ﬁll out an anonymous 137-question
survey, which typically takes 20 to 30 minutes. The ﬁrst half of the
survey contains demographic and behavioral questions (e.g.,
gender, parental education, race, college activities, etc.). The
second half contains attitudinal and self-reported behavioral
measures of subjects’trustfulness and trustworthiness.
The trust questions were chosen from several sources. In our
selection we emphasized questions from the General Social Sur-
vey, which contains a wide range of attitudinal questions about
trust. In addition, we designed numerous trust questions of our
own, including three questions to elicit past trusting behaviors.
Such behavioral information is not elicited by any of the GSS
questions. We ask:
h ‘‘How often do you lend money to your friends?’’
h ‘‘How often do you lend personal possessions to your
friends (e.g., CDs, clothes, bicycle, etc.)?’’
h ‘‘Howoftendoyouintentionallyleaveyourroominggroup’s
hallway door unlocked (when nobody is home)?’’
Acomplete copy of our survey is available upon request.
Part 2, The Trust Game. Three to four weeks after subjects
ﬁll out the survey, they come to a Harvard classroom to participate
18. Our recruitment handout and all of our other subject materials (e.g.,
consent forms, instructions, and debrieﬁng forms) are available upon request.
19. The Ec10 students are roughly representative of Harvard undergradu-
ates, since nearly two-thirds of the undergraduates take this course.
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When communicating with the subjects, we refer, respectively, to
the ‘‘Transfer Game’’ and the ‘‘Bonus Winnings Procedure.’’ For
clarity, we use the former, more descriptive titles here.
Subjects arrive at the experiment site, sign in, ﬁll out a
consent form, and are then paired with another subject to
participate in the ‘‘Trust Game.’’ Those who arrive together and
wish to play together are allowed to do so, raising the likelihood
that subjects who know each other will be paired.20 Others are
paired in order of arrival. After being paired, the subjects jointly
ﬁll out a social connection survey, which includes nine questions
about social links between the subjects. For example, we ask the
subjects to produce a list of all personal acquaintances whom they
have in common. Subjects tally and report the number of names
on their joint list, but keep the actual list of names to assure
anonymity of the subjects (and their friends).
After ﬁlling out the social connection survey, the subjects are
separated and told that they will not see each other again during
the course of the experiment. The rest of the game (steps 1–5 below) is
then explained to the separated subjects. Then the game is played.21
In the experimental instructions we refer to the subjects as
either RED or GREEN players. Each pair of subjects contains one
RED player and one GREEN player. In the current summary, we
use more meaningful labels: ‘‘sender’’ and ‘‘recipient.’’ The ﬁve
steps of the game are as follows.
(1) The sender is given $15.
(2) The recipient sends the sender a message/promise about
the recipient’s intended future actions in the game.
(3) The sender chooses to send all, some, or none of his/her
$15 to the recipient. We refer to this transfer as the
‘‘amount sent.’’
(4) The experimenters double whatever the sender chooses to
send. For example, if the amount sent is $4, the recipient
receives $8, and the sender keeps $11 of the original $15.
(5) The recipient chooses to send all, some, or none of the
received money back to the sender. We refer to this
transfer amount as the ‘‘amount returned.’’ For example,
20. In a small pilot study, we found that randomly paired subjects were highly
unlikely to know each other at all. Our nonrandom pairing procedure generates
more variation in social connection.
21. A formal analysis of this game appears in an earlier version of this paper
[Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter 1999].
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then the recipient gets to keep $7, and the sender gets to
keep $1 1 $11 5 $12.
Toimplementthisprocedure,subjectswritetheirdecisionson
a record sheet, which is placed in a coded envelope and collected
by a subset of experimental assistants who never see the contents
of the envelope. The other subset of experimental assistants who
actually open the envelopes (in a different room) never see the
subjects. Hence, subject anonymity (vis-a `-vis the experimenters)
is assured.
We implement step (2)—which allows the recipient to make a
promise—by giving the recipient (GREEN) the opportunity to
check one of two statements: (a) ‘‘I, person GREEN, promise to
repay RED at least as much as RED sends me. For example, if
RED sends me $4, which will be doubled by the experimenters to
$8, then I will repay RED at least $4,’’ or (b) ‘‘I, person GREEN,
make no promise to RED.’’22 One of these two statements must be
checked, and no other type of message is allowed. Our instructions
note that promises, if made, are not binding.
Half of our pairs of subjects are given the opportunity to make
a promise in the form described above. The other subjects receive
no opportunity to send a message, and no mention of a promise is
made in their experimental instructions.
Our procedure differs from the Berg-Dickhaut-McCabe [1995]
experiment on which it is based in three ways. First, unlike Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe we include a promise condition. Second,
the Berg-Dickhaut-McCabe procedure guarantees that individual
subject decisions are unobservable to all parties (i.e., both experi-
mentalists and other subjects). Our game only provides anonym-
ity vis-a `-vis the experimenters; the subjects know the identity of
the other subject in their pair. This knowledge creates variation in
social connection—some subject pairs know each other well, while
other pairs have only just met—enabling us to determine how
different levels of social connection inﬂuence trusting behavior.
However, removing subject-to-subject anonymity engenders an
undesirable ancillary effect: a sharp rise in the cooperative
behavior of senders. This increased cooperation is undesirable
because full and universal cooperation eliminates variation in
22. As we intended, all but one of the 47 subjects who were given the chance to
make the scripted promise did so. Our investigation differentiates between people
randomly given the opportunity to promise, not between people who did promise
versus people who could have promised and did not.
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Berg-Dickhaut-McCabe experiment in a third way. We only
double—rather than triple—the money that the sender sends to
the recipient, thereby reducing the incentive to cooperate.23
Part 3, The Envelope Drop. After completing the trust game,
subjects participate in a second experimental procedure that
provides an additional behavioral measure of trust. In this game
subjects report valuations for a series of ‘‘envelope drops.’’Speciﬁ-
cally, subjects are told that an experimental assistant will inten-
tionally drop in a public place an envelope containing 10 dollars
that is addressed to the subject. The envelope may be dropped in
one of several different public places (e.g., Harvard Square) under
one of several different conditions (e.g., sealed and stamped). For
each place and condition of the envelope drop, the subject reports
a valuation. We believe that the subject’s valuation of such an
envelope drop primarily measures conﬁdence that a random
pedestrian in that location will return the envelope to the subject
(say by putting it into a mailbox). The procedure may also
measure the subject’s trust that the experimenter will carry out
the envelope drop in the ﬁrst place.
To elicit truthful subject reporting, we use a standard revela-
tion mechanism.24 We randomly generate a payoff that is indepen-
dent of the subject’s valuation. We give the subject this payoff if
the subject’s reported valuation is below the payoff value. If the
subject’s reported valuation is above the payoff value, we carry out
the envelope drop. We vary properties of the envelope drop (e.g.,
location, time of day, stamp on envelope, envelope sealed). Each
subject provides valuations for ﬁfteen different envelope drop
conditions. Subjects report sensible changes in valuations across
conditions (see Appendix 3). We average each subject’s responses
across the ﬁfteen different envelope conditions offered to each
subject, and use this mean reservation value as our second
measure of trust.
We use the amount sent in the Trust Game and the mean
reservation value in the Envelope Drop as our two experimental
measures of trust. To measure trustworthiness, we use
return ratio 2 amount returned/amount available to return.
23. Despite this reduction in the incentive to cooperate, we still ﬁnd that
cooperationis‘‘too’’high:71percentofoursampleofsenderssendtheupperlimitof
the amount they are allowed to send (i.e., 15 dollars).
24. See Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak [1964].
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positive value for the amount available to return. Finally, recall
that the amount available to return is twice the amount sent. A
ratio of less than one-half indicates that the sender did not receive
back as much money as he or she risked and might thus be seen as
having been cheated by the recipient.
We use this ratio as a measure of trustworthiness for two
reasons. First, return ratio is always bounded between 0 and 1,
and hence is automatically scaled. Second, in our experimental
data there is a roughly proportional relationship between amount
returnedandamountavailabletoreturn.Weadoptthisproportion-
ality benchmark in our analysis.
IV. RESULTS
The average amount sent is $12.41, which is 83 percent of the
maximal amount that could be sent ($15). Of our 96 senders, 68, or
71 percent, chose to send exactly $15. However, the amount sent
data still exhibit substantial variation, with a standard deviation
of $4.54. Figure I plots the individual data points, with amount
sent on the x-axis and return ratio on the y-axis. The ﬂoating
numbers report the frequency with which a data point was
FIGURE I
The Relationship betweenAmount Sent andAmount Returned
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average value of return ratio is 45.5 percent.
The average mean reservation value from the Envelope Drop
is normalized to zero. The standard deviation is $1.77. The
distribution of mean reservation values approximates a bell curve
with little or no apparent truncation at the endpoints.
There exists substantial heterogeneity in trusting and trust-
worthy behavior, and our survey data enable us to identify the
variables that explain this variation.25 The observed heterogene-
ity could arise from individual ﬁxed effects, situationally speciﬁc
effects (e.g., partnership-speciﬁc attributes in the trust game), or
random noise.
We organize our analysis conceptually. First, we identify
individual ﬁxed effects in trust and trustworthiness. We look for a
relationship between behavior in the experiments and responses
to attitudinal survey questions. We also look for a relationship
between behaviors in different situations. Second, we identify the
effects of social connection between the sender and recipient.
Third, controlling for social connection, we ask whether some
subjects tend to fare well ﬁnancially in social interactions, per-
haps because of status effects. Such people may be thought of as
having individual social capital.
A. Individual Effects in Trust and Trustworthiness
We begin by looking at the level of trust our senders display
toward their partners. In Table III we examine whether survey
questions and other individual background characteristics predict
the amount sent in the Trust Game. In all regressions we include
six basic control variables: a promise condition dummy, a mixed-
gender pair dummy, a male sender dummy, a nonwhite sender
dummy, a freshman sender dummy, and an only child sender
dummy.26 Generally, these control variables are insigniﬁcant, and
their inclusion or exclusion does not affect any of our other results.
In the ﬁrst column of Table III, we evaluate the predictive
value of the GSS trust question. Senders who believe ‘‘that most
people can be trusted’’ send 22 cents more to their partners than
senders who believe ‘‘that you can’t be too careful in dealing with
25. Appendices 1 and 2 give the means and correlations from the survey and
the two experiments.
26. Thedummyvariableswerechosensothatapproximately50percentofthe
sample had a value of one for the variable. The only child dummy is an exception to
this rule.
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In the next regression we replace the basic GSS trust question
with an index of responses to three GSS attitudinal questions: the
original GSS trust question and two additional questions that
measure one’s conﬁdence in other people.
GSS fair: Do you think most people would try to take
advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be
fair?
GSS helpful: Would you say that most of the time people try to
be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?
We form an index of responses to these questions by adding
the three variables after they are de-meaned, normalized by their
standard deviations, and re-signed for comparability. Increases in
TABLE III
AMOUNT SENT AS A FUNCTION OF SENDER CHARACTERISTICS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Different sexes 20.670
(1.130)
20.128
(1.112)
21.043
(1.120)
20.358
(1.106)
20.643
(1.082)
Promise 0.043 20.097 0.440 20.038 20.153
(1.024) (1.015) (1.040) (.992) (0.995)
Male 0.147 0.623 20.028 0.457 20.013
(1.197) (1.174) (1.148) (1.149) (1.138)
White 20.330 20.640 0.055 20.227 20.329
(1.030) (1.025) (1.031) (1.003) (1.006)
Freshman 20.205 20.434 20.254 20.970 20.305
(1.136) (1.125) (1.092) (1.081) (1.086)
Only child 21.620 21.724 21.555 21.775 21.569
(1.53) (1.474) (1.496) (1.530) (1.492)
GSS trust 0.220
(1.022)
Trust index 20.094
(0.222)
Trust strangers 2.209
(1.060)
Trusting behavior
index
0.403
(0.214)
Mean reservation
value
0.417
(0.312)
Constant 13.361 13.009 9.836 12.707 13.336
(2.448) (1.735) (2.272) (1.648) (1.639)
Adj. R2 20.059 20.050 20.009 20.007 20.034
Observations 93 90 92 93 95
Standard errors are in parentheses.All regressions are ordinary least squares.
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of trust.
We included twelve different attitudinal measures of trust in
our survey, including two widely used multiquestion trust scales
from the psychology literature: the Rosenberg [1957] Faith in
People Scale (which has twelve component questions) and the
Rotter [1967, 1971] Interpersonal Trust Scale (which has 25
component questions). Of these twelve different attitudinal mea-
sures, all but two have no statistically signiﬁcant covariation with
the actual amount of trust in our experiment. Trust survey
questions at best only weakly predict trust. However, it is
important to highlight the statistical imprecision of these results.
Some of our standard errors are quite large, including our
standard errors for the GSS trust question.27
The two attitudinal survey questions that do signiﬁcantly
predict trusting behavior in the experiment ask speciﬁcally about
trust of strangers. In column (3) in Table III we ﬁnd that subjects
who disagree with the statement ‘‘you can’t trust strangers
anymore’’ are more trusting. Individuals who disagree with this
statement send over an average of $2.21 more than comparable
individuals who agree with the statement. Disagreement with
another statement from our survey—‘‘when dealing with strang-
ers, one is better off using caution before trusting them’’—is also
signiﬁcantly correlated with the amount of trust observed in our
experiment.
There are two plausible interpretations of these ﬁndings.
First, among so many trust questions it is unsurprising to ﬁnd two
27. Our attitudinal survey questions may not measure behavioral propensi-
ties, but may instead measure subjects’ beliefs about social norms. McClelland,
Koestner, and Weinberger [1989] report a distinction between explicit and implicit
attitudes in their study of ‘‘achievement motivation.’’ Explicit responses to an
attitude survey on achievement appeared to reveal beliefs about social norms for
achievement. These self-reports did not reﬂect durable personal commitments to
action and did not correlate with behaviors that could actually enhance achieve-
ment. Rather than depending on subjects’ explicit self-reports, McClelland,
Koestner, and Weinberger [1989] resorted to an implicit measure. They used
independent judgments of the extent to which subjects’indirectly obtained thought
patterns displayed associations typical of high interest in achievement. The
explicit measures were uncorrelated with these implicit measures, which did
predict actual behavior. The poor performance of explicit measures may reﬂect
limited self-knowledge, since much of the thinking process takes place outside of
consciousness (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson [1977] and Hirst [1998]). Alternatively,
subjects may distort their self-reports for presentational reasons. There is a
growing trend (e.g., Banaji and Greenwald [1994], and Greenwald and Banaji
[1995]) toward use of implicit cognitive measures. For example, Spalding and
Hardin [1999] have found behavioral links to implicit but not explicit measures of
self-esteem.
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predictive value.28 Second, the attitudinal questions regarding
strangers are more precise and meaningful than completely
general, nonspeciﬁc questions regarding trust. This high degree of
speciﬁcity might make these variables genuinely more predictive
than those of a more general nature.29 To further test whether the
connection between these variables and the amount sent is the
result of spurious correlation, we examine separately sender-
recipient pairs who are composed of two strangers and those who
are composed of two friends. We ﬁnd that the questions about
strangers only predict the amount of trust between strangers,
which supports their validity as measures of trust. This repre-
sents our ﬁrst piece of evidence in support of the hypothesis that
trusting behavior has a component that is a persistent, individual
characteristic.
In the fourth and ﬁfth regressions we examine the connection
between trusting behavior reported in the survey and trust in the
experiment. The fourth regression shows the connection between
an index of past trusting behavior and the amount sent. This index
is a weighted average of responses to questions about lending
possessions, lending money, and leaving your door unlocked.30 A
one-standard-deviation increase in this variable (2.13) increases
the dollar amount sent over by 86 cents (one-ﬁfth of a standard
deviation). In the ﬁfth regression we show a positive, but insigniﬁ-
cant, correlation between the mean reservation value and the
amount sent. Without controls, this relationship is signiﬁcant at
the 12.5 percent level.
We have also investigated several other potential determi-
nants of variation in the amount sent, including variation in
altruism and variation in early life experiences. Our measures of
28. However, the fact that the two signiﬁcant questions have similar concep-
tual content suggests more than a spurious correlation.
29. Declines in the attitude-behavior link occur when the level of speciﬁcity in
the survey question does not match that of the behavior under observation. The
problem is found here in the lack of correspondence between general GSS
questions and speciﬁc trusting behavior measured in our two experimental games.
McClelland, Koestner, and Weinberger [1989] found a similar discrepancy between
self-reports of general value placed on achievement and actual behavior to
increase achievement. The problem has been documented in other settings in a
review by Oskamp [1991]. In a meta-study, Kraus [1995] found that certain types
of questions tend to increase attitude-behavior correlation, including those
addressing direct experience and those with a focus on speciﬁc issues correspond-
ing to the speciﬁc behavior under observation. Both of our predictive questions
meet these two criteria.
30. The index is formed by de-meaning these three variables, dividing by
their standard deviations, and summing the resulting values.
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ing) do not predict amount sent and generally do not affect our
other coefficient estimates. To investigate the potential roots of
trust, we investigate proxies for past experiences that might have
led to a cynical or untrusting outlook (parental divorce, childhood
violence, etc.). These also had no effect.
In Table IV we examine the determinants of the level of trust
in the Envelope Drop game. We include an extra control variable,
lost mail, which measures the recency with which the respondent
lost an item in the mail. Responses to this question take on a value
between one (never) and four (within the last six months). A
one-standard-deviation increase in this variable (.99) predicts a
TABLE IV
MEAN RESERVATION VALUES AS A FUNCTION OF SUBJECT CHARACTERISTICS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male 0.1680 0.0975 0.1469 0.1923 0.1237 0.1716
(0.2810) (0.2890) (0.2820) (0.2850) (0.2784) (0.2870)
White 0.1599 0.1590 0.2028 0.1535 0.2036 0.1865
(0.2740) (0.2810) (0.2760) (0.2780) (0.2715) (0.2860)
Freshman 20.0857 20.0924 20.0633 20.0059 0.0561 0.1792
(0.2880) (0.2990) (0.2880) (0.2910) (0.2844) (0.2930)
Lost mail 20.2336
(0.1370)
20.2487
(0.1390)
20.2124
(0.1370)
20.2488
(0.1380)
20.2274
(0.1348)
20.2559
(0.1380)
Only child 0.0243
(0.4380)
0.0203
(0.4400)
20.2483
(0.4330)
0.2049
(0.4420)
20.1443
(0.4317)
20.1429
(0.4290)
GSS trust 0.2020
(0.2620)
Trust index 0.0396
(0.0610)
Trust strangers 0.6774
(0.2740)
Trusting
behavior
index
0.1354
(0.0640)
0.1299
(0.0621)
0.1324
(0.0650)
Pro-transfer 0.4570
(0.1448)
Past windfall 0.8779
(0.2720)
Constant 0.7239 0.5187 20.5439 0.4486 20.6265 1.6145
(0.6360) (0.5240) (0.6680) (0.5180) (0.6092) (0.6290)
Adj. R2 20.004 20.005 0.029 0.022 0.069 0.076
Observations 182 177 183 183 183 166
Standard errors are in parentheses.All regressions are ordinary least squares.
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mean reservation value. The impact of the lost mail variable
suggests the importance of past experiences, working presumably
through beliefs.31
In the ﬁrst regression of Table IV, we include the basic GSS
trust question. Individuals who answer yes to this question are
willing to pay 20 cents more for the 10-dollar envelope drop. This
effect goes in the right direction but is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In regression (2) we include the index of responses to the three
GSS attitudinal questions. A one-standard-deviation increase in
this GSS index (2.22) causes an insigniﬁcant 9-cent increase in
the mean reservation value. Ten of the twelve attitudinal trust
measures that we included in our survey are not signiﬁcantly
correlated with the mean reservation value.
Again, the two survey questions that speciﬁcally ask about
trusting strangers positively predict trust. As regression (3)
illustrates, individuals who believe that you can trust strangers
are willing to pay 68 cents more for the envelope. Again, this
result may be spurious, but if it is real, it suggests the presence of
stable individual attributes that create trust.
The fourth regression in Table IV shows the connection
between our index of past trusting behavior and the mean
reservation value. This index has a modest, signiﬁcant effect. A
one-standard-deviation increase in the index raises the level of
mean reservation value by 29 cents. The strongest connection
occurs between lending possessions and the mean reservation
value.
In the ﬁfth regression we show that being in favor of
redistribution to the poor predicts one’s mean reservation value.32
This may occur because dropping the envelope itself is seen as an
act of charity. Alternatively, people who favor redistribution may
simply have a higher level of general trust or a higher level of
conﬁdence in the behavior of individuals with low income who
might pick up the envelope.
To further explore the predictive value of the redistribution
question, we examine the inﬂuence of this variable on subject
reservation values for envelope drops in low income areas (e.g.,
Central Square, a relatively less affluent community near Har-
31. Unlike the rest of our survey questions, the lost mail question was asked
after the experiment, as part of a debrieﬁng.
32. Behavioral measures of altruism (hours spent on volunteer work or
dollars given to charity) are orthogonal to this redistribution variable.
MEASURING TRUST 829
Page829
@xyserv1/disk4/CLS_jrnlkz/GRP_qjec/JOB_qjec115-3/DIV_107a01 dawnvard Square) and high income areas (e.g., Harvard Square). The
strongest connection between the responses to the redistribution
question and reservation value occurs in low income areas. Indeed
there was no connection between the redistribution question and
reservation values for the envelopes dropped in Harvard Square.
Hence, subjects who favor redistribution appear either to believe
that dropping the envelope is an act of charity when the envelope
is dropped in a low income community, or to have greater
conﬁdence in the honesty of low income individuals who ﬁnd
dropped envelopes.
In the sixth regression we show that there appears to be some
cognitive basis for higher trust. People who say that they have
beneﬁted from the generosity of an anonymous stranger in the
past give more. This suggests that trust does not just reﬂect
altruism or risk tolerance, but also beliefs about others which are
formed by past experiences.
Turning now from the senders’trust, we look at the recipients’
trustworthiness. In Table V we examine the effect of recipient
characteristics on the value of return ratio (i.e., amount returned
divided by amount available to return). We add the amount of
money sent over in the ﬁrst round (i.e., amount sent) as a control
variable and ﬁnd that this variable has a statistically signiﬁcant
but economically small positive effect on return ratio. As Figure I
shows graphically, on average recipients return as much as they
are sent. This might reﬂect reciprocal altruism as in Rabin [1993],
but it might also reﬂect prevailing norms about fair play.33
These norms were inﬂuenced by the promise condition.
Figures II and III plot histograms of return ratio values for subject
pairs in the ‘‘no promise’’ and ‘‘promise’’ conditions. In the no
promise condition 48 percent of recipients returned exactly as
much as they were sent. By contrast, in the promise condition 68
percent of recipients returned exactly as much as they were sent.
But on average return ratio did not vary between the two
conditions. Instead, the promise condition seemed to anchor
responses on the rule, ‘‘send back as much as you were sent,’’
thereby reducing heterogeneity in the distribution of return ratio.
The promise pulled mass away from both the selﬁsh and generous
tails of the distribution.
33. This ﬁnding is harder to reconcile with inequality aversion which would
generally imply that senders who send 5 dollars or less should not receive anything
in return. Even if nothing is returned, the sender will have at least as much
experimental earnings as the recipient.
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level of trustworthiness, we can test whether trustworthiness is a
stable characteristic. In the ﬁrst regression in Table V, we ﬁnd
that our controls actually have some impact. Being nonwhite and
being a freshman slightly depress trustworthiness. More signiﬁ-
cantly, only children are much less likely to return money. Being
an only child reduces the amount sent back by 22 percent. This
result would be even stronger without control variables. The
average subject without siblings returns 40 percent of the amount
that was sent over. While this result is certainly among the most
provocative of this study, our small sample size (ten only children)
leads us to withhold judgment until there is further independent
veriﬁcation of an only child effect on trustworthiness.
TABLE V
RETURN RATIO AS A FUNCTION OF RECIPIENT CHARACTERISTICS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount sent 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.014
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Different sexes 0.003 20.007 0.006 0.001
(0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.065)
Promise 20.043 20.007 20.031 0.017
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.063)
Male 0.027 0.048 0.013 20.015
(0.059) (0.058) (0.061) (0.073)
White 0.075 0.072 0.074 0.061
(0.054) (0.052) (0.055) (0.065)
Freshman 20.072 20.052 20.083 20.009
(0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.071)
Only child 20.217 20.242 20.218 20.191
(0.092) (0.089) (0.088) (0.112)
GSS trust 0.106
(0.051)
Trust index 0.043
(0.012)
Self-reported trustworthi-
ness
20.026
(0.026)
Honesty index 0.010
(0.008)
Constant 0.414 0.212 0.386 0.246
(0.149) (0.120) (0.185) (0.147)
Adj. R2 0.161 0.232 0.138 0.036
Observations 90 88 91 64
Standard errors are in parentheses.All regressions are ordinary least squares.
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Distribution of Return Ratio in ‘‘Promise’’Condition
FIGURE II
Distribution of Return Ratio in ‘‘No Promise’’Condition
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money returned and the GSS trust question. In regression (2) in
Table V we ﬁnd an even stronger relationship between the level of
trustworthiness and the index of trust-related questions (GSS
Trust, GSS Helpful, and GSS Fair). The strongest subcomponent
of that index is the question about whether a subject thinks other
people are fair. There are signiﬁcant correlations between many of
the attitudinal measures of trust and the experimental measure
of trustworthiness.
These ﬁndings suggest that the standard trust questions may
be picking up trustworthiness rather than trust. Tables I and II
take on a substantially different meaning when viewed in that
light. The micro-evidence on cohorts or education might then be
interpretedassuggestingthatthesegroupsdifferintheirtrustwor-
thiness, not their trust. When aggregated up to the country or
region level, presumably a measure of trustworthiness is as good
(or better) a measure of social capital as a measure of trust.34
In regression (3) of Table V we show that there is a negative,
insigniﬁcant connection between self-reported trustworthiness
and actual trustworthiness. We are not surprised that those
people who are willing to admit to being untrustworthy are not
the least trustworthy of our subjects. This result adds further
weight to our earlier ﬁndings that subjects’ responses to attitudi-
nal questions can rarely be taken at face value. Instead, our
results imply that the best way to determine whether or not a
person is trustworthy is to ask him whether or not he trusts
others.
The ﬁnal regression in this table presents an index of past
honesty. This is a normalized average of subject answers to four
questions about the frequency of lying to parents, roommates,
acquaintances, and close friends. This reverse-scored self-
reported behavioral measure of honesty weakly predicts the level
of trustworthiness. The important components of the index relate
to lying to acquaintances and lying to close friends. Again, it
34. One possible explanation for our trustworthiness effects is that people
asked to report how much they trust others must search for information with
which to answer the question. Their ﬁrst step might be to determine whether they
think people are trustworthy. People regularly overestimate the extent to which
others are like them (the ‘‘false consensus effect’’[Ross, Green, and House 1977], so
people who are themselves trustworthy would be likely to construe others as
trustworthy. Having decided that others are usually trustworthy, it would be a
reasonable ﬁnal step to conclude that one’s trust of others was high. Schwarz
[1999] suggests that a process such as this lies at the heart of all attitudinal
self-evaluations.
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asking about opinions.
B. Social Connections
The social capital literature assumes that social connections
(e.g., clubs, organizations, friendships, etc.) mitigate the free-
rider problem and facilitate cooperative social interaction. In
Table VI we determine whether social connection between sender
and recipient increases trust and trustworthiness in our experiment.
We use two basic measures of social connections: months
since ﬁrst meeting and number of friends that the sender and
recipient have in common. To lessen the impact of outliers, we
have topcoded the number of months at 36 and the number of
friends at 30. We include both the index of past trusting behavior
and the GSS survey question on trust as added controls.
The ﬁrst and ﬁfth regressions of Table VI show the effect of
months since ﬁrst meeting on amount sent and return ratio. The
coefficient in the amount sent regression is signiﬁcant at the 90
percent level; the coefficient in the return ratio regression is
signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level. The coefficients are not small.A
one-standard-deviation increase in time known raises amount
sent by 80 cents and return ratio by 5 percent.
In the second and sixth regressions we look at the number of
friends in common. There is a positive, insigniﬁcant effect of this
variable on amount sent and return ratio. The economic magni-
tudes of the coefficients, though, are not inconsequential. For
example, ten extra friends apparently raises return ratio by 2.6
percent, at least in our relatively small sample.
Inthethirdandseventhregressionswetestwhetherindividu-
als from different countries trust each other less. We ﬁnd a small
but insigniﬁcant negative effect on amount sent, but a large and
very signiﬁcant effect on return ratio. People are much more likely
to return low amounts if they are facing someone from a different
country. This result is much stronger than the results on social
connection, and it is unchanged when we control for social
connection.
The differences between regressions (3) and (7) pose a puzzle.
If trustworthiness between nationalities is so low, why is trust
itself not affected by national differences within a subject pair?
Perhaps our coefficient in the trust equation is imprecisely
measured. Alternatively, senders may truly fail to infer that they
will receive less back from recipients from a different national-
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INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL CONNECTION ON AMOUNT SENT AND RETURN RATIO
Amount sent as function of
sender and pair characteristics
Return ratio as function of
recipient and pair characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Amount sent 0.0143
(0.0069)
0.0151
(0.0069)
0.0170
(0.0066)
0.0140
(0.0069)
Promise 20.0796 0.0308 0.0416 20.0597 20.0548 20.0539 20.0358 20.0691
(1.0060) (1.0153) (1.0319) (1.0380) (0.0511) (0.0515) (0.0501) (0.0519)
Different
sex
20.2899
(1.1372)
0.0455
(1.1890)
20.2118
(1.1750)
20.2243
(1.1657)
0.0067
(0.0530)
0.0331
(0.0577)
0.0328
(0.0528)
0.0050
(0.0536)
Male 0.3777 0.5750 0.6190 0.6453 0.0477 0.0622 0.0458 0.0448
(1.1950) (1.2007) (1.2168) (1.2251) (0.0589) (0.0621) (0.0570) (0.0584)
White 20.3568 20.1940 20.2490 0.0589 0.0497 0.0567
(1.0082) (1.0203) (1.0274) (0.0541) (0.0553) (0.0527)
Freshman 0.3029 20.0344 0.0387 0.0215 20.0557 20.0668 20.0730 20.0641
(1.1270) (1.1251) (1.1484) (1.1406) (0.0549) (0.0550) (0.0532) (0.0553)
Only child 21.9766
(1.5499)
21.6304
(1.5724)
21.8404
(1.5906)
21.7288
(1.5966)
20.2222
(0.0933)
20.2447
(0.0944)
20.2149
(0.0909)
20.2302
(0.0950)
Trusting
behavior
index
0.3997
(0.2157)
0.3788
(0.2199)
0.4020
(0.2206)
0.3964
(0.2216)
0.0027
(0.0153)
0.0061
(0.0153)
0.0021
(0.0148)
0.0061
(0.0153)
GSS trust 0.1581
(1.0136)
0.1978
(1.0260)
0.1580
(1.0323)
0.2080
(1.0461)
20.1004
(0.0530)
20.1057
(0.0537)
20.1048
(0.0516)
20.0800
(0.0541)
Months
since ﬁrst
meeting
0.1016
(0.0614)
0.0060
(0.0032)
Number of
common
friends
0.0310
(0.0321)
0.0026
(0.0017)
Different
nationality
20.2174
(1.2509)
20.1749
(0.0616)
White sender,
Nonwhite
recipient
20.7496
(1.4726)
20.1092
(0.0623)
Nonwhite
sender,
white
recipient
20.2350
(1.1579)
20.1231
(0.0665)
Nonwhite
sender, non-
white
recipient
20.1040
(2.5213)
20.0893
(0.1250)
Constant 12.0169 11.6161 12.2148 12.1904 0.4327 0.4058 0.4533 0.5433
(2.4486) (2.5578) (2.4951) (2.5012) (0.1501) (0.1527) (0.1462) (0.1455)
Adjusted R2 20.0006 20.0224 20.0337 20.0433 0.159 0.1457 0.2029 0.1471
Observations 92 92 92 92 89 89 89 89
Standard errors are in parentheses.All regressions are ordinary least squares.
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experiment and the complexity of implementing backward induc-
tion. Perhaps this failure arises because Harvard students are
loathe to assume/acknowledge that their partners may exhibit
nationalistic preferences.
Regressions (4) and (8) of Table VI look at the impact of
within-pair racial differences. In our sample, more than 35
percent of the subjects are Asian, so there is considerable racial
heterogeneity. To analyze race, we divide the subject pairs into
four groups: white sender/white recipient (the omitted category),
white sender/nonwhite recipient, nonwhite sender/white recipi-
ent and nonwhite sender/nonwhite recipient. Note that subject
pairs in the last group may still exhibit within-pair heterogeneity,
since the nonwhite category is quite broad.
None of the group effects are signiﬁcant in the amount sent
regressions, but all three groups have lower return ratios than the
white/white omitted category. The lowest return ratios occur
when white recipients return money to nonwhite senders. Most
strikingly, 92 percent of the cases where the recipient sent back
nothing occurred when the individuals were of different races,
while only 59 percent of the pairings were racially diverse.
The negative effect of different races may occur because
people from different races or countries have a lower probability of
interacting in the future, but the nationality and race effects
change little when we control for the two social connection
variables. Alternatively, lower levels of trustworthiness between
races may instead reﬂect lower levels of reciprocal altruism.
Whatever the interpretation, these results suggest that heteroge-
neity may decrease trustworthiness in social groups.36
C. Social Status and Individual Social Capital
Social capital has two rival conceptualizations. Many original
users of the term, James [1904], and more recently Loury [1977])
saw social capital as an individual-speciﬁc variable reﬂecting
35. These results support those of Fershtman and Gneezy [1998], but differ in
important ways. First, they examine trust of all people toward a low status
minority and ﬁnd that there is less trust. Second, their subjects have no possibility
of repeated interaction after the game. Third, they allow no personal contact
between subjects, who must infer ethnicity from the last name of their partners.
Fershtman and Gneezy ﬁnd no ethnic effects on amounts returned, but they look
only at the effect of the sender being Sephardic, not at any effects of sender-
recipient ethnic similarity on the amount returned.
36. La Porta et al. [1997] argue that ethnic heterogeneity may decrease the
quality of government by limiting the formation of aggregate social capital.
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[1990] and Putnam [1993, 1995] have used the term to describe
group-level attributes, like the existence of a social network
among a group of friends. We examine evidence for the former
conceptualization in this subsection.
In Table VII we test whether people with high levels of social
status systematically realize high returns from social interac-
tions. Many different mechanisms could support such regularity.
For example, high status individuals may elicit trustworthy
behavior because they are relatively skilled at socially punishing
or rewarding others.
Table VII identiﬁes individual characteristics that predict
high individual returns in the trust experiment. Conceptually, we
demonstrate the existence of individual-speciﬁc social capital. We
focus on characteristics of the sender that predict ﬁnancial
success for the sender. Characteristics of the recipient that predict
success generally work because the characteristics predict cheat-
ing (i.e., returning less than the amount sent). This cheating may
be punished after the experiment ends, during routine social
interactions among Harvard students. So the total returns to the
recipient, including nonﬁnancial returns, are likely not to be
observed.
In our ﬁrst regression we examine two measures of the
sender’s family status: (1) hours spent working for pay and (2)
whether one’s father has a college degree. Hours spent working for
pay as a college student is strongly correlated with low family
income (44 percent), and we believe it is a signiﬁcantly better
measure than the categorical family income variable that we
have. We also include two social connection variables. First, we
include the self-reported number of close friends that the indi-
vidual says he has (top-coded at 20). Second, we include the
number of hours per week that the individual spends volunteer-
ing. Approximately two-thirds of Harvard undergraduates volun-
teer regularly, and this is a particularly general form of social
interaction. We also include two proxies for ‘‘coolness’’or charisma
in this subject population: beers drunk per week and whether the
individual has a sexual partner.37
In the ﬁrst regression we ﬁnd that working for pay has a
negative effect on amount sent but this effect is only marginally
37. This variable takes on a value of one if the individual has a current
girlfriend or boyfriend and if the individual has had sex with at least one other
person in the past ﬁve years.
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tion is insigniﬁcant. Of the other variables, only having a sexual
partner positively predicts trust.
In the second regression we regress return ratio on character-
istics of the sender. This regression identiﬁes several sender
38. The impact of the working for pay variable may reﬂect standard income
effects.
TABLE VII
SOCIAL CAPITAL,S TATUS, AND THE RETURNS TO SOCIAL CAPITAL
Amount
sent as a
function
of sender
characteristics
(1)
Return
ratio as a
function
of sender
characteristics
(2)
Financial
returns to
s e n d e ra sa
function
of sender
characteristics
(3)
Financial
returns to
recipient
as a function
of sender
characteristics
(4)
Promise 20.0450 20.0103 0.1881 20.2331
(0.1010) (0.0491) (1.2238) (1.5552)
Different sex 20.8162
(1.1147)
0.0887
(0.0541)
2.0264
(1.3510)
22.8426
(1.7168)
White 0.2571 0.0114 0.4036 20.1470
(1.0743) (0.0519) (1.3021) (1.6546)
Male 20.1849 0.1008 2.8013 22.9861
(1.1733) (0.0565) (1.4220) (1.8070)
Freshman 0.3741 20.0174 0.4294 20.0553
(1.2394) (0.0602) (1.5021) (1.9088)
Only child 22.5365
(1.5545)
0.0578
(0.0780)
0.7949
(1.8840)
23.3314
(2.3941)
Father with college
degree
20.3324
(2.0752)
0.1407
(0.0987)
2.3978
(2.5151)
22.7302
(3.1961)
Hours worked for
pay
20.1441
(0.0869)
20.0092
(0.0043)
20.2273
(0.1053)
0.0832
(0.1338)
Number of close
friends
20.0919
(0.0658)
0.0112
(0.0032)
0.1684
(0.0798)
20.2603
(0.1014)
Hours spent volun-
teering
0.0306
(0.2031)
0.0261
(0.0099)
0.6893
(0.2462)
20.6586
(0.3128)
Sexual partner 2.8618
(1.4861)
0.1726
(0.0723)
4.7588
(1.8012)
21.8969
(2.2889)
Beer servings 0.0471
(0.1243)
0.0136
(0.0063)
0.3399
(0.1507)
20.2929
(0.1915)
Amount sent 0.0118
(0.0065)
Constant 13.7772 20.0690 5.8516 22.9256
(2.7993) (0.1591) (3.3926) (4.3112)
Adjusted R2 20.0061 0.308 0.2006 0.0735
Observations 93 89 93 93
Standard errors are in parentheses.All regressions are ordinary least squares.
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well treated by the recipients. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant coefficients on
all variables except for father’s education. Father’s education,
however, becomes signiﬁcant if hours worked for pay is dropped
fromtheregression.Theeffectsareoftenquitelarge.Forexample,
people without sexual partners receive 17 percent less back than
people who do have sexual partners (this is true of both men and
women).
These two regressions provide only partial snapshots of the
impact of social capital, because the regressions evaluate sepa-
rately amount sent and return ratio. The artiﬁcial but controlled
setting of our experiment has the advantage that we can precisely
measure total ﬁnancial returns from this particular social interac-
tion. We next regress total ﬁnancial returns (from the Trust
Game) on personal characteristics of our subjects. We perform this
regression separately for individuals in the sender and the
recipient position.All returns are measured in dollars.
Column (3) in Table VII reports the results of the sender
regression. Again, all variables except for father’s college status
are signiﬁcant. Without controls, the father’s education variable
becomes much stronger. The average return for senders whose
father graduated from college is 14.75 dollars. The average return
for senders whose fathers did not graduate from college is 9.29
dollars. It appears that senders from families with lower human
capital would have been better off ﬁnancially if they had not
trusted their partners. Comparing senders from high and low
income families also demonstrates these effects. The average
returns for senders from high income families was more than 2
dollars greater than the average returns for senders from low
income families. These higher returns appear to come solely from
the ability to elicit trustworthy behavior.
We ﬁnd that senders who work for pay receive less from the
social interaction. Senders with sexual partners take home over 4
dollars more than their celibate classmates. Individuals who
drink beer earn more. Finally, a one-standard-deviation increase
in the volunteering variable raises ﬁnancial returns from the
game by almost 2 dollars.
Since social capital of the sender does not predict higher
values of amount sent, but does predict higher values of return
ratio, it seems likely that social capital of the sender has negative
ﬁnancial externalities for the recipient. Regression (4) in Table
VII conﬁrms this conjecture. We regress the total ﬁnancial returns
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ﬁnd that all of the social capital variables that increase the
ﬁnancial returns for the sender decrease the returns to the
recipient. In this experiment these types of social capital lead to
redistribution from one player to another. As such, the social
capital that we have identiﬁed appears to generate private, not
group, returns. Findings like this underscore the importance of
distinguishing between individual and group-level conceptualiza-
tions of social capital.
Finally, we note that these results may not generalize. Social
capital could have increased everyone’s returns in the Trust Game
only if it had increased the level of trust in the ﬁrst period. But a
large share of our sample of senders chose to send the maximal
amount.As such, there may have been insufficient opportunity for
the positive effects of social capital to operate on group returns.
Naturally, the earlier warnings about the limited size of our
sample and the special features of our games and subject popula-
tion apply here as well.
V. CONCLUSION
Using two experiments, we investigated whether trust, trust-
worthiness, and social capital are characteristics of individuals as
well as groups. Past trusting behavior correlates with trusting
behavior in our experiments. The levels of trust in the two
experiments are weakly correlated with each other. We also found
that two of our attitudinal survey questions about trusting
strangers both predict trust. Hence, trusting behavior has a stable
individual-speciﬁc component. However, this component is at best
weakly measured by typical attitudinal questions about trust,
including the widely studied GSS trust question. Trustworthiness
also seems to be stable and is strongly predicted by attitudinal
survey questions about trust (not trustworthiness) and by having
siblings.
In summary, to determine whether someone is trusting, ask
him about speciﬁc instances of past trusting behaviors. To deter-
mine whether someone is trustworthy, ask him if he trusts others.
There are two additional sets of results from these experi-
ments. First, social connection strongly predicts trustworthiness
and weakly predicts trust. In particular, national and racial
differences between partners strongly predict a tendency to cheat
one another.
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tus, social skill, and charisma strongly predict one’s total ﬁnancial
returns in the trust experiment. These variables matter because
people in our sample are less likely to cheat individuals with these
characteristics. These results suggest that some people have
‘‘individual social capital,’’ a subcomponent of human capital that
reﬂects an ability to earn returns from social situations.
There are three major implications of this paper for future
research. First, social capital is a meaningful, individual-level
variable that can be studied with the tools of price theory.39 Our
evidence supports the view that human capital includes not only
cognitive and physical abilities but also social capital, e.g.,
interpersonal skills, status, and access to social networks (as in
Bowles and Gintis [1976]).
Second, standard survey questions about trust do not appear
to measure trust. However, they do measure trustworthiness,
which is one ingredient of social capital. This means that most
work using these survey questions needs to be somewhat reinter-
preted. If future surveys hope to measure trust, then other
instruments, including questions about past trusting behavior,
should be developed and empirically validated.40
Finally, we believe that this paper demonstrates the value of
using experiments and surveys together. Experiments measure
preferences, behavioral propensities, and other individual at-
tributes much more convincingly than surveys, since experiments
provide direct observations of behavior. By connecting experi-
ments and surveys, we can determine the socioeconomic corre-
lates of hard-to-measure individual attributes, and test the
validity of survey measures of these attributes.
39. However, aggregation will be much more difficult than for other forms of
capital.
40. Indirect psychological measures of attitudes have been shown to be more
effective than direct measures [McClelland, Koestner, and Weinberger 1989].
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Variable name Question/description Answer range
Mean
(standard
deviation)
Amount sent Amount sent from the sender to
the recipient in the trust game
0–15 12.41
(4.54)
Beer servings The number of beers consumed per
week
Positive real numbers 2.03
(4.13)
Behavioral index Normalized index of lend money,
lend possessions, and leave door
unlocked
Real numbers 2.03
(2.13)
Close friends Number of close friends Positive real numbers
capped at 30
7.24
(6.32)
Common friends Number of friends the two partici-
pants of the trust game have in
common
Positive real numbers
capped at 50
12.54
(16.08)
Different nation-
ality
Are the participants in the trust
game from different countries?
No—0
Yes—1
0.25
(0.43)
Different sex Are the participants in the trust
game of opposite sex?
No—0
Yes—1
0.42
(0.49)
Different race Are the participants in the trust
game of different races?
No—0
Yes—1
0.58
(0.49)
Door unlocked ‘‘How often do you leave your door
unlocked?’’
Very often—1
Often—2
Sometime—3
Rarely—4
Never—5
4.26
(1.11)
Father w/BA Father with a college degree No—0
Yes—1
0.90
(0.28)
Freshman Freshman No—0
Yes—1
0.68
(0.46)
GSS fair ‘‘Do you think most people would
try to take advantage of you if
they got a chance, or would they
t r yt ob ef a i r ? ’ ’
Would take advantage of
you—1
Would try to be fair—2
1.56
(0.49)
GSS help ‘‘Would you say that most of the
time people try to be helpful, or
that they are mostly just looking
out for themselves?’’
Try to be helpful—1
Just look out for them-
selves—2
1.61
(0.49)
GSS trust ‘‘Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be
trusted or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?’’
Most people can be
trusted—1
Can’t be too careful—2
1.51
(.50)
GSS index (trust
index)
Normalized average of GSS fair,
GSS trust, and GSS help
Positive real numbers 0.00
(2.22)
Honesty index Average of ﬁve questions rating
frequency of lying to parents,
roommates, acquaintances, close
friends and partners on a scale
of 1 (very often) to 5 (never).
[2.2, 5] 3.99
(.50)
Hours worked for
pay
The number of hours worked for
pay per week
Positive real numbers
capped at 45 hours
4.67
(6.50)
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Variable name Question/description Answer range
Mean
(standard
deviation)
Hours volun-
teering
The number of hours spend volun-
teering per week
Positive real numbers
capped at 60 hours
1.95
(2.65)
Lend money ‘‘How often do you lend money to
friends?’’
More than once a
week—1
About once a week—2
About once a month—3
Once a year or less—4
2.85
(1.15)
Lend possessions ‘‘How often do you lend personal
possessions to friends?’’
More than once a
week—1
About once a week—2
About once a month—3
Once a year or less—4
2.44
(1.18)
Lost mail ‘‘Have you or someone close to you
recently lost something in the
mail?’’
Never—1
Not in several years—2
Within 1–2 years—3
Within the last 6
months—4
2.54
(0.99)
Male Male No—0
Yes—1
0.68
(0.46)
Mean reservation
value
Average of reservation values over
all the envelope drop conditions
0–10 0.002
(1.77)
Only child Only child No—0
Yes—1
0.11
(0.32)
Past windfall ‘‘Have you every spontaneously
beneﬁtted from the generosity of
someone you never knew
before?’’
No—0
Yes—1
0.57
(0.50)
Pro-transfer ‘‘Personal income shouldn’t be
determined by work.’’
Disagree strongly—1
Disagree somewhat—2
Agree somewhat—3
Agree strongly—4
2.17
(0.89)
Promise Promise to return at least as much
to the sender as sent
Agreed—0
Didn’t agree—1
0.48
(0.50)
Return ratio (Amount returned to sender)/
(amount recipient received)
[0,1] 0.46
(0.27)
Sexual partner Does the participant have a sexual
partner?
No—0
Yes—1
0.17
(0.38)
Stranger (trust
stranger)
‘‘You can’t count on strangers any-
more.’’
More or less agree—1
More or less disagree—2
1.39
(0.05)
Time since met The number of months the sender
and recipient have known each
other. Capped at 36 months
Positive real value 2.73
(7.83)
Trustworthy (self-
reported trust-
worthiness)
‘‘I am trustworthy’’ Disagree strongly—1
Disagree somewhat—2
Disagree slightly—3
Agree slightly—4
Agree somewhat—5
Agree strongly—6
5.31
(0.93)
White White No—0
Yes—1
0.61
(0.49)
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Mean reservation
value
Amount
sent
GSS
trust
GSS
index
Trust
stranger
Amount sent 0.1580
(0.1222)
97
GSS trust 20.0636 20.0117
(0.3899) (0.9103)
185 95
GSS index 0.0663 20.0582 20.7505
(0.3767) (0.5815) (0.0000)
180 92 253
Trust stranger 0.1874 0.1894 20.3665 0.3530
(0.0104) (0.0674) (0.0000) (0.0000)
186 94 257 251
Behavioral index 0.1457 0.2240 20.2036 0.0930 0.1355
(0.0472) (0.0291) (0.0010) (0.1418) (0.0293)
186 95 257 251 259
First entries are correlation coefficients. P-values are in parentheses. Last entries are numbers of observations.
APPENDIX 2b: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN OUTCOMES AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Mean
reservation
value
Amount sent
as a function
of sender
characteristics
Amount sent
as a function
of recipient
characteristics
Return ratio
as a function
of sender
characteristics
Return ratio
as a function
of recipient
characteristics
Male 0.0462 0.0478 20.0890 0.1181 0.0241
(0.5274) (0.6419) (0.3887) (0.2597) (0.8198)
189 97 96 93 92
White 0.0805 20.0031 20.1212 0.1095 0.1387
(0.2686) (0.9758) (0.2370) (0.2962) (0.1850)
191 97 97 93 93
Freshman 20.0259 20.0573 20.0222 20.1265 20.0812
(0.7219) (0.5774) (0.8289) (0.2268) (0.4390)
191 97 97 93 93
Only child 20.0485 20.0129 20.0256 20.0020 20.2394
(0.5078) (0.2066) (0.8047) (0.9845) (0.0215)
189 97 96 93 92
Number of
common friends
20.0045
(0.9511)
191
0.1455
(0.1551)
97
0.1242
(0.2255)
97
0.1583
(0.1296)
93
0.1441
(0.1681)
93
Hours volun-
teering
0.0113
(0.8768)
191
0.0573
(0.5773)
97
0.0198
(0.8470)
97
0.2085
(0.0449)
93
0.0854
(0.4158)
93
Hours worked
for pay
20.0499
(0.4928)
191
20.1407
(0.1691)
97
0.0935
(0.3624)
97
20.2397
(0.0207)
93
0.0183
(0.8617)
93
Different coun-
tries
20.0628
(0.5414)
97
20.0628
(0.5414)
97
20.3210
(0.0017)
93
20.3210
(0.0017)
93
Different races 20.0143
(0.8898)
97
20.0143
(0.8898)
97
20.2447
(0.0181)
93
20.2447
(0.0181)
93
Number of close
friends
20.0945
(0.3574)
97
20.0376
(0.7150)
97
0.2412
(0.0199)
93
0.0003
(0.9980)
93
First entries are correlation coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. Third entries are number
of observations.
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